FACULTY AND RESEARCH

It has long been recognised that accounting regulation is not a mere technical exercise but one that takes place in a political context and lobbying has been examined in numerous empirical studies. Most of these studies address lobbying of the accounting standard setter. However, standard setting is embedded in a political and institutional context. In their decision-making, these institutions depend on the expertise of potentially self-interested lobbyists. This expertise-provision element tends to be ignored in most lobbying studies. The present paper proposes an analytical model of lobbying of an accounting regulator that explicitly focuses on the provision of relevant information by lobbyists. It suggests that lobbying will generally be non-controversial, i.e. either those opposed to a standard will lobby or those favouring it, but not both. Analysis of the model furthermore implies an important role for the regulator’s ex ante leanings, both perceived and real, even when the regulator treats all information received impartially. This implies an important role for the institutional context of accounting regulation.