Elite-led revolutions

Revolutions are often perceived as the key event triggering the fall of an autocratic regime and leading to democracy. However, the historical record does not agree with this picture: revolutions are rare, elite-driven, and often non-democratising. We develop a three-stage game-theoretic model of elite-driven, non-democratising institutional changes triggered by popular uprisings. Our model includes four key ingredients: (i) a minority/majority split in the population; (ii) the persistence of fiscal particularism post-revolution; (iii) the presence of windfall resources; and (iv) endogenous labour supply. Under autocracy, the minority is an insider elite closely allied with the autocrat and enjoys a fiscal premium. In the revolutionary process, the minority acts as a Stackelberg leader in setting wealth redistribution in the post-revolution regime, in exchange for sharing the revolution costs with the majority and giving up its fiscal premium under autocracy. We show that elite-led revolutions can emerge only when polarisation is moderate. Resource windfalls and labour market repression can also play a role in triggering this ‘alliance’ between the majority and the elite. If an elite-led revolution happens, redistribution in the subsequent regime still favours the elite, although the masses are better off. We discuss the assumptions and outcomes of our theory in light of some recent revolutionary events.