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Trust and social capital in the regulation of lending activities
2003, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 31(6), pp.673-699
Abstract
When a bank grants a loan, it takes the risk that the borrower will not honor his debt. To reduce this uncertainty, banks have created instrumental evaluation methods in order to try to evaluate the risk more objectively. An analysis of financial counselors’ practices shows the limits of these methods. To obtain information needed for the financial risk evaluation and to reduce the information asymmetry between bankers and borrowers, financial counselors integrate social networks to establish bonds of trust and to accumulate social capital. The quality of the social bond determines the quality of the gathered information and therefore the quality of the risk evaluation. Bank management is aware of the limits of instrumental methods and the importance of social risk evaluation. To improve their economic efficiency, they modify their work organization and their management practices so as to facilitate the emergence of a bond of trust and the accumulation of social capital by their financial counselors. The analysis of economic actors’ speech and behavior involved in activities of credit shows that behind the claimed altruism nature of the trust relationship exists an economic rationality whose social and temporal horizons of optimization differ from the model of the trade exchange seen in conventional economic theory.

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